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present. Thus in Kearney the court put the burden of proving the
validity and continued existence of the first marriage upon parties
who did not have personal knowledge of the facts, but in Williams
it refused to place the burden on the party who did have personal
knowledge.
If the court is basing its refusal to allow the intervenor the
benefit of the presumption because she is an intervenor rather than
a defendant, the court is putting unwarranted stress on who gets
to court first and instigates the suit. The fact that the second wife
has gone through the requisite marriage ceremony and has lived
with a man as his wife for several years without any objection from
his former wife should have the same significance regardless of
whether she is the plaintiff, defendant or intervenor. If, on the
other hand, the court is refusing to allow the intevenor the benefit
of the presumption because it has decided to no longer afford the
second marriage a presumption of validity, the court, as stated in the
dissenting opinion in Williams, should expressly overrule the
Kearney case and specifically state what the law is in this state.
Regardless of why the court in Williams failed to give the bene-
fit of the presumption to the intervenor, the better policy would
seem to be to uniformly place the burden on the party attacking the
validity of the second marriage. Not only does public policy'0
dictate that the second marriage be presumed valid, but also the
first wife is in a better position to give evidence about the contract
to which she is a party than the second wife. Thus it is hoped
that at its next opportunity the court will make clear that the pre-
sumption of validity of the second marriage, as adopted in the
Kearney case, is available to all parties, regardless of their position
in the action.
H. MORRISON JOHNSTON, JR.
Federal Jurisdiction-Diversity of Citizenship-Corporation's
Principal Place of Business-Multiple Incorporation
In Kelly v. United States Steel Corp.' the Third Circuit Court
of Appeals was called upon for the first time to interpret the term
"principal place of business" as used in the diversity jurisdiction
" Marriage being an accepted and desirable social institution, the court
should favor the parties alleging the marriage by presuming them innocent
of bigamy and by presuming the children by the union legitimate.
1284 F.2d 850 (3d Cir. 1960).
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statute.' The plaintiff initiated action in the federal district court
alleging diversity of citizenship as the grounds for jurisdiction. The
complaint alleged that the plaintiff was a citizen of Pennsylvania
and the defendant a Delaware corporation with its principal place
of business in New York. The defendant sought dismissal for want
of jurisdiction claiming that diversity of citizenship was lacking in
that Pennsylvania, and not New York, was its principal place of
business. The district court dismissed the action for want of juris-
diction. On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed.
The sole question before the court was the location of the de-
fendant's principal place of business. In determining this, the court
pointed out that it was a question of fact to be determined by the
court, and that what facts were significant and determinative in
this matter were left to the court's discretion.' However, it was
considered unsound to attempt to find a single factor or criterion by
which the question of the principal place of business could be de-
termined. The court proposed that the proper method was to analyze
the question and attempt to select, after an examination of the entire
corporate structure, the combination of factors which pointed to some
one place as the principal place of business.
The plaintiff introduced evidence4 which showed that final ap-
proval of over-all corporate policy and financial matters was made
by the board of directors from the New York offices. It was con-
tended that this, along with other similar activities carried on in the
New York executive offices, was sufficient to establish New York as
the defendant's principal place of business.
However, after an examination of all phases of the corporation's
activities, the court concluded that the occasional meeting of the
policy making directors in New York was not sufficient to establish
this site as the defendant's principal place of business. The court
held that Pennsylvania, where the corporate policy was actually
' "For the purposes of this section and section 1441 of this title, a
corporation shall be deemed a citizen of any State by which it has been in-
corporated and of the State where it has its principal place of business."
72 Stat. 415, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (1958).
'"The conclusion that certain facts are or are not helpful in deciding the
question is a question of legal standard, or legal concept, and is one for a
court to decide as a question of law." 284 F.2d at 852.
' Upon challenge of the jurisdiction, the party invoking federal juris-
diction must prove that the requisite jurisdictional facts are present. Metro
Industrial Painting Corp. v. Terminal Constr. Co., 181 F. Supp. 130
(S.D.N.Y. 1960).
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formulated and where the business activities were centered, was the
principal place of business.
While the exercise of co-ordination and direction of corporate
policy and affairs from Pennsylvania was the apparent basis of the
decision, the court did not disregard the physical operations of the
corporation. The location of the majority of the corporate assets
and steel production in Pennsylvania, while of lesser importance than
the control factors previously mentioned, was considered by the court
to lend weight to the finding that Pennsylvania was the principal
place of business.
The Kelly case is a good example of the difficulty which the courts
may encounter in determining the principal place of business, espe-
cially when considering a gigantic corporation such as United States
Steel Corporation. Therefore, resulting decisions are often, admit-
tedly, somewhat artificial.5 While the question of the principal place
of business has long been of significance in the bankruptcy law,0 it is
only since the 1958 amendment of the Judicial Code that this con-
cept has become important in the field of federal jurisdiction.
Prior to the 1958 amendment, the law was well established that
a corporation for diversity purposes 'was a citizen of the state in
which it was incorporated.7 In 1958, pressured by an ever-
increasing case load in the federal courts,' Congress enacted the new
284 F.2d at 853.The test of the "principal place of business" is one of the jurisdictional
criterion for the bankruptcy courts. Bankruptcy Act, 66 Stat. 420 (1952),
11 U.S.C. § 11 (1958).
' Originally the term "citizen" as used in the federal constitution was not
interpreted to include corporations. Bank of the United States v. Deveaux,
9 U.S. (5 Cranch.) 61 (1809); Hope Ins. Co. v. Boardman, 9 U.S. (5
Cranch.) 57 (1809) ; Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch.) 267 (1806).
But in Louisville, C. & C. R.R. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497 (1844),
the Court held that a corporation was deemed a citizen of the state in which
it was incorporated regardless of the citizenship of the stockholders.
Corporate citizenship underwent a final change in Marshall v. Baltimore &
0. R.R., 57 U.S. (16 How.) 314 (1853), where it was held that the stock-
holders of the corporation were conclusively presumed to be citizens of the
state in which the corporation was incorporated. This fiction of the corpo-
rate citizenship continued until the 1958 amendment.
8 "In the years following World War II the judicial business of the
United States district courts increased tremendously. Total civil cases filed
are up 75 percent and the private civil business has more than doubled in the
districts having exclusively Federal jurisdiction. Most of the increase has
occurred in the diversity of citizenship cases, which have increased from
7,286 in 1941 to 20,524 in 1956. A large portion of this caseload involves
corporations. Of the 20,524 diversity of citizenship cases filed in the district
courts during fiscal 1956 corporations were parties in 12,732 cases, or 62
[Vol. 40
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diversity provision, the effect of which was to give some corpora-
tions dual citizenship. Under the statute a corporation is; a citizen
of both the state of its incorporation and the state in which its prin-
cipal place of business is located.
The new citizenship in the state of the corporation's principal
"place of business was created to eliminate the evil of a local business
bringing its litigations into the federal courts simply because it was
incorporated in some other state. It was hoped that by enlarging the
corporation's citizenship the number of corporate cases in which
jurisdiction was based on diversity could be decreased. 9
In adopting the criterion of .the principal place of business as one
of the means of conferring corporate citizenship, Congress was not
creating a new concept, but was in fact adopting the term from the
bankruptcy statute."° It was believed that by using this standard
many of the problems of interpretation could be avoided because
the courts would find sufficient guidance in the interpretation of the
phrase in the bankruptcy cases in which the location of the principal
place of business had been in issue." But by examining the bank-
ruptcy cases, it will be seen that Congress: could hardly have selected
a more confusing term.
It is stated in the bankruptcy cases' 2 that what constitutes the
principal place of business is a question of fact to be determined in
each particular case. Thus, being a question of fact, the nature of
the corporate business and its activities must be considered.' 3  As
to this the bankruptcy cases are in harmony. But in determining the
principal place of business, the bankruptcy cases have derived two
distinct tests based upon a consideration of two different types
of evidence. One line of cases' 4 holds that the principal place of
percent." S. REP. No. 1830, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 3100 (1958).
Id. at 3101-02.
"0 Bankruptcy Act, 66 Stat. 420 (1952), 11 U.S.C. § 11 (1958).
1 S. REP. No. 1830, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
3100, 3102 (1958).
"2E.g., It re Hudson River Nay. Corp., 59 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1932) ; It
re Diamond Star Timber Corp., 64 F. Supp. 849 (N.D.N.Y. 1946); In re
DeSoto Crude Oil Purchasing Corp., 35 F. Supp. 1 (W.D. La. 1940).
" E.g., It re Diamond Star Timber Corp., supra note 12; In re Devonian
Mineral Spring Co., 272 Fed. 527 (N.D. Ohio 1920); In re Worcester
Footwear Co., 251 Fed. 760 (D. Mass. 1918).
"E.g., Shearin v. Cortez Oil Co., 92 F.2d 855 (5th Cir. 1937); In re
Guanacevi Tunnel Co., 201 Fed. 316 (2d Cir. 1912); It re Portex Oil Co.,
30 F. Supp. 138 (D. Ore. 1939); In re American & British Mfg. Corp., 300
1961]
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business is where the home office or nerve center of the corporation
is located, while other cases 5 have taken the position that it is where
the actual operations of the corporation are carried on.
Under the home office or nerve center test the location of the
principal place of business is held to be the same as that of the main
or central office of the corporation from which radiates the power
and control over all corporate activities. 6 In determining this focal
point of corporate activities, the location of the managing offices,
stockholder's meetings, board meetings, executives, books and
records, and banking activities, are all significant factors, although
no one factor is conclusive evidence of the principal place of busi-
ness.
Under the actual operations test the court first determines what
the principal business of the corporation actually is17 and then con-
siders the location of the facilities needed to carry on this primary
activity.'" The site of these facilities is deemed the principal place
of business. The location of factories, personnel, production equip-
ment, mines and quarries are the prime objects with which the court
is concerned. The location of control over these physical assets is
only secondary.
While Congress made it clear that it was permissible for the
courts, when applying the jurisdictional test of the principal place of
business, to be guided by the standards established in the bank-
ruptcy cases, they failed to indicate which of the two tests should be
applied. In examining the cases decided since the 1958 diversity
provision went into effect, in which the main issue has been the
determination of the principal place of business, it will be seen that
the courts have, at various times, adopted both of the bankruptcy
tests.
Fed. 839 (D. Conn. 1924); In re Worcester Footwear Co., supra note 13;
In re Matthews Consol. Slate Co., 144 Fed. 724 (D. Mass. 1905).
" E.g., In re Pusey & Jones Co., 286 Fed. 88 (2d Cir. 1922); Dryden
v. Ranger Ref. & Pipe Line Co., 280 Fed. 257 (5th Cir. 1922); Continental
Coal Corp. v. Roszelle Bros., 242 Fed. 243 (6th Cir. 1917); Watters v. Ham-
ilton Gas Co., 10 F. Supp. 323 (S.D. W. Va. 1935); In re Tygarts River
Coal Co., 203 Fed. 178 (N.D. W. Va. 1913).
" In re Matthews Consol. Slate Co., 144 Fed. 724 (D. Mass. 1905) ; See
generally 1 COLLIER, BAXRUPTCYZ § 2.19(2) (14th ed. 1956).
"'E.g., In re Tygarts River Coal Co., 203 Fed. 178 (N.D. W. Va. 1913);
In re Elmira Steel Co., 109 Fed. 456 (N.D.N.Y. 1901).
" In re Tygarts River Coal Co., supra note 17; See generally 1 COLIER,
op. cit. supra note 16.
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Scot Typewriter Co. v. Underwood Corp.9 is the best example
of an application of the home office test. The defendant was a Del-
aware corporation engaged in manufacturing, distributing and
selling typewriters and business machines. The defendant's manu-
facturing plants were located in Connecticut, New Jersey and Cali-
fornia, and sales offices were located in virtually all other states.
However, its executive offices, from which the over-all supervision
and co-ordination of sales and production, as well as a determination
of corporate policy originated, were in New York. Under these facts
the court applied the home office test and held that New York
was the defendant's principal place of business. The court stated :2o
Where a corporation is engaged in far-flung and varied ac-
tivities which are carried on in different states, its principal
place of business is the nerve center from which it radiates
out to its constituent parts and from which its officers direct,
control and coordinate all activities without regard to locale,
in the furtherance of the corporate objective.
An excellent example of an application of the actual operations
test is found in Mattson v. Cuyuna Ore Co.2 The defendant corpo-
ration carried on extensive mining operations in Minnesota. All the
mining property, personnel and equipment were located in Min-
nesota. However, the home office and chief executives of the corpo-
ration were in Ohio, and the business transaction out of which the
litigation arose originated from these Ohio offices. It was the
court's view that the home office was a mere incident to the corpora-
tion's existence, and that the principal place of business was that
place where the corporation's actual mining operations were carried
on.
22
While it is true that under the fact situation presented in Kelly
the resulting determination of the principal place of business would
have been the same regardless of which test was used, there was in
" 170 F. Supp. 862 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).0 Id. at 865. For other cases applying the "home office test" see Textron
Electronics, Inc. v. Unholtz-Dickie Corp., 193 F. Supp. 456 (D. Conn. 1961);
Wear-Ever Alum., Inc. v. Sipos, 184 F. Supp. 364 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); Hughes
v. United Eng'rs & Constructors, Inc., 178 F. Supp. 895 (S.D.N.Y. 1959);
Riley v. Gulf, M. & 0. R.R., 173 F. Supp. 416 (S.D. Ill. 1959).
" 180 F. Supp. 743 (D. Minn. 1960).
" For other cases applying the "actual operations" test see Gilardi v.
Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 189 F. Supp. 82 (N.D. Ill. 1960); Potocni v. Asco
Mining Co., 186 F. Supp. 912 (W.D. Pa. 1960); Webster v. Wilke, 186 F.
Supp. 199 (S.D. Ill. 1960).
1961]
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Kelly a definite attempt to reject any single criterion as the sole test
for the principal place of business. However, in two recent decisions
the Kelly case has been construed as following both the actual opera-
tions and the nerve center tests. In Potocni v. Asco Mining Co.2 3
the court applied the actual operations test and claimed to rely upon
the then unreported decision of Kelly v. United States Steel Corp.,
24
while in Textron Electronics, Inc. v. Unholtz-Dickie Corp.,5 the
court viewed Kelly as an application of the nerve center test in spite
of the court's language repudiating this test.26 Therefore, consider-
ing the manner in which the district courts have interpreted the
Kelly case, it is doubtful that the bankruptcy tests will be discarded,
but in all probability these tests will continue to be the basis of future
decisions.
The problem of determining the principal place of business is
not the only difficulty the courts in the future will encounter. The
question of the citizenship of the multi-state corporation and the
effect the new statute will have on this citizenship is as yet un-
decided.
In the early cases27 decided under the new diversity provision it
was held that when a corporation had its principal place of business
in a state other than the state of incorporation, the corporation
would have dual citizenship; and if either of the citizenships coin-
cided with that of the adverse party, there was no diversity within
the meaning of the statute. In reaching this result the courts have
emphasized the two following points: (1) the intention of the legis-
lature was to limit jurisdiction, not broaden it; and (2) the statute
clearly provides that a corporation is a citizen of the state of in-
corporation and the state of its principal place of business.
2 8
186 F. Supp. 912 (W.D. Pa. 1960).
2 "I am in accord with the view expressed by my associate, Judge Joseph
P. Willson, that the state wherein a corporation carries on its chief opera-
tions is the principal place of business of that corporation, Kelly v. United
States Steel Corporation, Ca17251, filed February 17, 1960, officially un-
reported." Id. at 912-13.
2 193 F. Supp. 456 (D. Conn. 1961).
2 6 Id. at 459.
2 Canton v. Angelina Cas. Co., 279 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1960); Buck
v. New York C. R.R., 275 F.2d 292 (7th Cir. 1960); Webster v. Wilke, 186
F. Supp. 199 (S.D. Ill. 1960); Mattson v. Cuyuna Ore Co., 180 F. Supp.
743 (D. Minn. 1960); Bryfogle v. Acme Mkt., Inc., 176 F. Supp. 43 (E.D.
Pa. 1959); Moesser v. Crucible Steel Co., 173 F. Supp. 953 (W.D. Pa.
1959); Scot Typewriter Co. v. Underwood Corp., 170 F. Supp. 862
(S.D.N.Y. 1959); Jaconski v. McCloskey & Co., 167 F. Supp. 537 (E.D.
Pa. 1958).
28 "The Act does not give an option to a plaintiff of treating a corpora-
(Vol. 40
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Thus far, however, the courts have not been called upon to
determine the effect of the 1958 diversity provision upon the citizen-
ship of the true multi-state corporation-a corporation incorporated
under the laws of more than one state.29 Prior to the 1958 amend-
ment, a majority of the cases3" held that a corporation incorporated
in the state in which suit was brought would be considered a citizen
of that state alone, regardless of the fact that the corporation may
have been incorporated elsewhere. This result was based on the
theory that when the corporation is sued in a state in which it is
incorporated, only the laws of that jurisdiction are brought into
play, and the fact that the corporation is incorporated elsewhere has
no relevance to that particular controversy.3 Thus if an action was
brought in federal court in State A by a citizen of State B against
a corporation incorporated under the laws of both States A and B,
diversity was held to exist.32
When this multi-state situation comes squarely before the court
under the new statute, it is believed, in light of the clear language
used in the statute,3" that the multi-state corporation will be con-
sidered a citizen of any and every state in which it is incorporated
regardless of where the action is brought; and if any one of these
citizenships coincides with that of the opposing litigant, diversity
will be found to be lacking. The clear intention of the legislature to
limit diversity, as well as the cases holding that the litigants cannot
choose whether citizenship will be by incorporation or the principal
place of business, lend support to this view.
This view has not, however, received complete acceptance. The
tion as a citizen either of the state of incorporation or of the state where
its principal place of business is located. The Act treats a corporation as a
citizen of the state where it has its principal place of business as well as the
state of incorporation. This is clearly indicated by the use of the conjunc-
tive 'and'. The purpose of the law was to narrow jurisdiction, not to broaden
it." Canton v. Angelina Cas. Co., supra note 27, at 554.
3 Jaconski v. McCloskey & Co., 167 F. Supp. 537 (E.D. Pa. 1958).
"°E.g., Jacobson v. New York, N. H. & H. R.R., 206 F.2d 153 (1st Cir.
1953), aff'd mem., 347 U.S. 909 (1954).
31 Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. v. Eder, 174 Fed. 944, 945-46 (6th Cir. 1909).
"2 Pennsylvania R.R. v. St. Louis, A. & T. H. R.R., 118 U.S. 290 (1886);
Muller v. Dows, 94 U.S. 444 (1876); Boston & M. R.R. v. Breslin, 80 F.2d
749 (1st Cir. 1935); Boston & M. R.R. v. Hurd, 108 Fed. 116 (1st Cir.
1901); Lucas v. New York C. R.R., 88 F. Supp. 536 (S.D.N.Y. 1950); cf.
Seavey v. Boston & M. R.R., 197 F.2d 485 (1st Cir. 1952); Delaware River
Joint Toll Bridge Comm'n v. Miller, 147 F. Supp. 270 (E.D. Pa. 1956).
" "[A] corporation shall be deemed a citizen of any State by which it has
been incorporated and of the State where it has its principal place of busi-
ness." 72 Stat. 415, 28 U.S.C., §,1332(c) (1958). (Emphasis added.)
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position has been taken84 that the law regarding the multi-state
corporation prior to the 1958 amendment was so well settled that
had Congress intended to effect a change in this law, such intention
would have been expressed either in the statute or the legislative
history of the act. Since this matter was apparently not considered
by Congress, it is argued that the established law in this field is still
in effect. Furthermore, in Jaconski v. McCloskey & Co."' the
court, in a dictum, stated that "the 1958 amendment of the Revised
Judicial Code is not understood to have direct bearing upon the bare
question of the effect of multiple incorporation in diversity litiga-
tion."36 When the problem of multiple incorporation is raised under
the new diversity provision, the apparent failure of Congress to
consider this situation and the pronouncement in Jaconski will un-
doubtedly lend strong support to the argument favoring a continu-
ance of the old multi-state corporation case law.
While the problem of multiple incorporation is such that it will
probably be settled when a case is properly presented to the court,
the question of what is the principal place of business will be one
which the courts will continue to encounter in the future. The courts
have thus far developed no definite rules for determining the prin-
cipal place of business, and the bankruptcy tests continue to be ac-
cepted. However, a new test by which the courts will determine
which of the two existing tests shall be applied to a particular situa-
tion is apparently developing. In those cases in which the home
office test was applied"7 a definite similarity can be seen in the type
of corporations involved-corporations with activities in many sep-
arate states, no one state being completely dominate over any other.
Conversely, in those cases in which the actual operations test has
been accepted,38 the corporations involved maintained virtually all
their tangible assets in one state and exercised control over them
" Note, 27 GEO. WAsHr. L. REV. 595 (1959). Cf. FINS, FEDERAL JURIS-
DICTION AND PROCEDURE 12 (1960); 3 VOLTZ, WEST'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
MANUAL § 3142 (1960).
"167 F. Supp. 537 (E.D. Pa. 1958).
"Id. at 540 (dictum). A similar dictum is found in Fitzgerald v.
Southern Ry., 176 F. Supp. 445, 446 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
'T E.g., Textron Electronics, Inc. v. Unholtz-Dickie Corp., 193 F. Supp.
456 (D. Conn. 1961); Riley v. Gulf, M. & 0. R.R., 173 F. Supp. 416 (S.D.
Ill. 1959); Scot Typewriter Co. v. Underwood Corp., 170 F. Supp. 862
(S.D.N.Y. 1959).
"E.g., Potocni v. Asco Mining Co., 186 F. Supp. 912 (W.D. Pa. 1960);
Webster v. Wilke, 186 F. Supp. 199 (S.D. Ill. 1960); Mattson v. Cuyuna
Ore Co., 180 F. Supp. 743 (D. Minn. 1960).
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from another state. Furthermore, on numerous occasions when the
actual operations test has been applied, the courts have pointed out
that their acceptance of the actual operations test is not a rejection
of the applicability of the nerve center test under appropriate cir-
cumstances-when the activities of the corporation are scattered
among many states.3" Thus considering the manner in which the
courts have applied the bankruptcy tests so far, it is arguable that
when the corporation is concentrated in one state, the actual opera-
tions test will be applied, but in cases in which the corporate assets
are dispersed among many states, the home office or nerve center
test will be invoked.
It is still too soon, however, to ascertain whether this prelim-
inary test will continue to be utilized to determine which of the
bankruptcy tests will be applied. It is hoped that through continual
development of this preliminary test, some degree of certainty will
be introduced into the method of determining a corporation's prin-
cipal place of business.
GLEN B. HARDYMON
Federal Jurisdiction-Political Question-Non-Justiciability of State
Reapportionments
In a recent decision,' the United States Supreme Court once
again declined to consider a voting right case under the equal pro-
tection clause of the fourteenth amendment. In this case, however,
the Court invoked its jurisdiction under the fifteenth amendment.
The petitioners, all Negroes, alleged that an act of the Alabama legis-
lature2 was a device to disenfranchise Negro citizens in the Tus-
kegee, Alabama municipal elections and that enforcement of this act
would deny to them their rights guaranteed under the equal pro-
tection clause of the fourteenth amendment and their right to vote
under the fifteenth amendment. 3  The district court dismissed the
action for lack of jurisdiction, stating that the question presented
was of a political nature and thus not justiciable. This was affirmed
by the court of appeals, but the Supreme Court reversed.
" E.g., Gilardi v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. 189 F. Supp. 82 (N.D. Ill.
1960) ; Webster v. Wilke, supra note 38.
1 Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
'Ala. Acts 1957, No. 140.
8 The petitioners alleged that the act changed the originally square shaped
municipal boundary into a twenty-eight sided figure that was designed to
and in fact did, eliminate all but three or four of the Negro voters from the
town.
1961]
